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I. INTRODUCTION
What Appalachia needs to do to save itself is pave the way from here to

elsewhere. Or, at least that's what some bureaucrats thought back in the early
1960s, when the Appalachian Regional Commission proposed building more
than twenty highways through some of the wildest stretches of land left in the
East.' Believing that a critical mass of asphalt would foster economic and social
development in these isolated regions, the commission called for pavement to
connect rural outposts stretching from New York to Mississippi. 2 One of the

highways proposed as part of the "Appalachia Development Highway System"
was Corridor H, and it was planned to stretch across 140 miles of West Virginia,
from the center of the state at Weston to the eastern border with Virginia.3 Once
completed, the highway would cut east from Interstate 79, Exit 99, through the
municipalities of Elkins, Parsons, and Davis, through two national forests, and
through the towns of Bismark, Moorefield, and Wardensville. The purpose of
Corridor H was to quickly connect the interior of West Virginia to Washington,
D.C., and other metropolitan points in the East. 5 Additionally, officials envi-

I

WV Corridor H, Press Room White Paper, http://www.wvcorridorh.com/press/white.html

(last visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter White Paper].
2
Id.
3

Id.

4
WV Corridor H, The Route, http://www.wvcorridorh.con/route/route.html (Oct. 20, 2008)
[hereinafter The Route].
5
See White Paper, supra note 1.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2009

1

West Virginia Law
Review,
Vol. 111,
Iss.REVIEW
2 [2009], Art. 8
WEST
VIRGINIA
LAW

[Vol. 111

sioned Corridor H as an emergency escape route from the nation's capital.6 The
proposed cost was over $1 billion.7
Yet, more than forty years after officials laid plans for the highway, only about sixty-four miles of Corridor H have been built. 8 Today, the completed
sections of the highway run from Weston to Elkins (approximately forty miles),
from Elkins to Kerens (nine miles), and from Moorefield to Wardensville (approximately twenty miles). 9 Currently, $840.3 million has been spent on the
project, and officials estimate completion will cost an additional $1.3 billion.1 °
No end is in sight. Today, the western-most stretch of highway unceremoniously
ends at Kerens, where several lonely cement barriers block eastbound drivers
from plunging off the end of the unfinished road. Vehicles are shunted off the
highway and onto Route 219, the old-fashioned two-lane, replete with tiny
towns and hairpin turns that Corridor H aims to eventually bypass.
The reasons for delay are many, but politics reigns chief among them.
Environmental watchdogs have branded Corridor H as the "road to nowhere"
because it won't actually connect with a four-lane highway in Virginia. 1 Additionally, Corridor H requires 100 separate stream crossings and would cut asphalt swaths through the George Washington and Monongahela National Forests, the largest roadless areas in the East.12 The highway would come alarmingly close to Blackwater Falls State Park, one of the crown jewels of West
Virginia's park system. A lawsuit brought by citizens in 1996 halted construction near Elkins; as a result of the suit's settlement in 2000, the remaining 100
miles had to be broken into nine segments and the state must justify each segment before construction can begin. 13 In short, with a revised price tag of more
than $2 billion, coupled with its long reach across private and public lands, Corridor H has become a bureaucratic boondoggle.
This Note explores the historical background as well as the future implications of Corridor H and concludes that the government must be more forthright and transparent in its condemnation of private lands. First, this Note analyzes one case of Corridor H condemnation in West Virginia wherein the landowner fought for the right to see all the appraisals the state performed on his
land.14 Second, this Note examines the background of discovery in condemna6

Elsa Brenner, Road to Progress,or End of a Rural Lifestyle?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 2006, at §

11, availableat 2006 WLNR 16983633.
7
White Paper, supra note 1.
8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Jake Stump, Corridor H Funding for 2008 on Par with Past Years, CHARLESTON DAILY

MAIL, Dec. 4, 2007, at 8A, availableat 2007 WLNR 24033279.
11 Elsa Brenner, supra note 6.
12 Road to Ruin: Corridor H, http://thomas-wv.com/Articles/RoadToRuin.htm (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008).
13

14

Id.
W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, 639 S.E.2d 693 (W. Va. 2006).
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tion cases, specifically the expert witness rule found in both the West Virginia
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 In examining this discovery rule, this
Note explores the split that exists in the courts over whether landowners have a
right to see all the appraisals the government performed on their condemned
property in a suit for just compensation. Third, this Note closely examines two
arguments that landowners have made in an attempt to force the state to fully
disclose all its appraisals of condemned land.
Finally, this Note ultimately concludes that condemnation proceedings
are inherently "exceptional circumstances" and the government's appraisals are
therefore not shielded from discovery by Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Thus, in the discovery phase of a just compensation suit, the state should be forced to reveal all the
appraisals it performs on condemned land, not just the appraisals it hand-selects
to use at trial. For, as Justice Larry Starcher of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals wrote, "the government is the proverbial 800-pound gorilla...
In these lopsided circumstances, a property owner is entitled to anything that
can help make the case for full compensation. These are inherently 'exceptional
circumstances."16

H.

A CASE

STUDY OF CONDEMNATION LAW IN WEST VIRGINIA

One specific issue complicating the whole Corridor H project is the
state's prerequisite need to condemn private lands. Take, for example, the situation of Fort Pleasant Farms, located in the city of Moorefield, West Virginia.
Here, the state spent several years fighting to complete its condemnation of approximately forty-eight acres of Fort Pleasant Farms. 17 Although
the state has
18
already taken the land, the issue of "just compensation" remains.
Of course, the state and the landowner place different monetary values
on the land. 19 The landowner's appraisals of the taken land, which includes the
15
16

17

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (2008); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (2008).
Cookman, 639 S.E.2d at 700 (Starcher, J., dissenting).
"The taking diagonally severed Fort Pleasant's 160 acre parcel of land and, as a result, 13.58

acres in the south residue was left completely landlocked. Furthermore, the remaining residue of
98 acres in the northern portion of the parcel has been damaged because the access road to the
acreage has been eliminated and additional surface water has been diverted onto the property as a
result of the highway. The taking also included approximately 2.5 million yards of fine, fissel
shale in a DOH designated quarry area ....
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Fort Pleasant Farms, Inc., No. 04-C-51 (Circuit
Court of Hardy County, W. Va. July 13, 2007).
18 The federal government has a constitutional mandate to give the landowner "just compensation" for any taking in an eminent domain proceeding. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Because the taking of private property without just compensation was also found to violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court incorporated that mandate to the states
in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).

19

"Because land appraisal is complex and technical, usually evidence on the issue of value

consists principally of the opinions of opposing experts. These opinions are notoriously disparate." United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
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land that the state took, damaged, and landlocked, fall between $2.6 million and
$3 million; this figure includes an overall mineral value of approximately $1
million. 20 The state's valuation of the land, however, appears to be much less.
In June 2004, the West Virginia Department of Highways paid out $189,340 as
estimated just compensation. 2' Then, without any further explanation, the state
later paid the landowner additional sums of $102,200 and $73,386.16.22 Finally,
in August 2005, the state gave the landowner an additional $35,743.79.23 These
deposits bring the landowner's "just compensation" for the taking, damage, residue, and lost minerals to $400,855.95.24 That figure is a long way from the
landowner's estimates of $2.6 million to $3 million.
So how did the state arrive at its figure? No one but the state knows,
and it's not talking. Instead of trying to resolve the problem in a transparent and
forthright fashion, the state simply refused to show the landowner all the stateperformed appraisals of his property. In fact, the state fought hard to maintain
the secrecy of its appraisals in the Fort Pleasant case: after the circuit court ordered the state to produce all of its appraisals, the state twice appealed to the
state's highest court.25
As far back as 2004, the Fort PleasantFarms landowner sought information via discovery procedures. 26 He not only sought the state-performed appraisal reports and evaluations of his condemned property, but he also sought all
state-performed appraisals and evaluations on other condemned properties located within one-half mile of the Fort Pleasant property.27 The state refused to
furnish these documents. However, in early 2006, Hardy County Circuit Court
Judge Donald Cookman granted the landowner's motion to compel the state to
hand over the documents.28 In response, the state sought a writ of prohibition
from the Supreme Court of Appeals. 29 The Supreme Court of Appeals, in W
Va. Department of Transportation v. Cookman,30 remanded so the lower court
could make the findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to justify production of the documents. 31 The circuit court did just that, and in August 2007,
20

Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 17, at 2.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.

24

W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, 639 S.E.2d 693 (W. Va. 2006); Petition for Writ of
Prohibition, W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, No. 04-C-51 (W. Va. Oct. 11, 2007).
26
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 17, at 3.
27
Id. The landowner also originally sought appraisals on all condemned land done within one
2

mile of his property, but later revised that request to condemned properties located within one-half
mile of his property. Id. at 3-4.
28
Id. at4.
29
Cookman, 639 S.E.2d at 696.
30
Id. at 693.
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the circuit court again ordered the state to produce the appraisals. 32 The state
a second writ of prosubsequently petitioned the Supreme
33 Court of Appeals for
hibition, but was denied any relief.
Put simply, the state of West Virginia has taken a citizen's land, arguably worth millions of dollars, and has wordlessly given him a few hundred thousand dollars as "just compensation." Furthermore, the state has staunchly resisted the landowner's requests that it justify how it arrived at its figure. This
procedure cannot be the logical result of a law 34 that calls for the "fair and equitable treatment by state agencies of persons displaced from property" and "to
assure consistent treatment of persons and promote public confidence in ...
land acquisition practices. 35
It boggles the mind as to how the West Virginia Department of Highways can, in good faith, fulfill its statutory mandate "to avoid litigation ... to
assure consistent treatment ...and [to] promote public confidence. . ."by operating in secret. 36 As regards Fort Pleasant's property, the state's production
of all the appraisals it commissioned on the condemned land would go a long
way towards explaining how state officials decided that $400,000 was "just
compensation" for the land. 37 Furthermore, a consistent judicial policy requiring the government to produce all of its appraisals in all condemnation cases
would certainly help balance the power inequities that exist between a property
owner and the condemning state.
However, as of today, the right of a West Virginia landowner to discover the government's appraisals in condemnation cases remains in flux. Because
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to definitively settle this
important discovery issue,38 the circuit courts are left to their own and varied
devices. The Supreme Court of Appeals should have seized on the Fort Pleasant
situation as an opportunity to clarify the law, and should have ruled that landowners have an automatic right to all the government's appraisals in eminent
domain cases because, as this Note articulates, this is the only fair solution for
both landowners and taxpayers.

31

Id. at 700.

32

Order Granting Renewed Motion to Compel, at 5, W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Fort Pleasant

Farms, Inc., No. 04-C-51 (Circuit Court of Hardy County Aug. 16, 2007).
33 Petition for Writ of Prohibition, W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, No. 04-C-51 (W. Va.
Oct. 11, 2007).
34 Implementation of Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970 and the 1987 Amendments Thereto Known as Title IV of the Surface Transportation
and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, W. VA. CODE §§ 54-3-1 to -5 (2008).
35 § 54-3-2.
36

Id.

37

Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 17, at 3.
W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, 639 S.E.2d 693, 700 (W. Va. 2006).

38
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III. THE RULES OF CONDEMNATION

The main rules guiding condemnation cases like the Fort Pleasant
Farms case detailed above are the eminent domain statutes and the expert witness discovery rules. Regarding the former, the specific purposes of eminent
domain law are:
(1) to require the establishment of a uniform policy for the fair
and equitable treatment by state agencies of persons displaced
from property in order that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuriesas a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole and (2) to encourage and expedite
the acquisition of real property or any interest therein by agreements with persons so as to avoid litigationand relieve congestion in the courts, to assure consistent treatment of persons and
promote public confidence in the land acquisition practices of
any state agency.39
Furthermore, the courts seem to impose on the government a good faith
requirement to treat the landowner fairly: "[T]he defendant is always entitled to
just compensation for property taken. The condemnor concedes the right to
compensation and presumably is always willing to pay a certain sum. ' ' 4 0 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the "guiding principle" of just
compensation is one of reimbursement. 41 Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated in United States v. Reynolds,42 "[tihe owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken. 43
Intertwined with the state and federal condemnation statutes is the "expert witness" discovery rule, or Rule 26(b)(4) of both the West Virginia and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Before Congress in 197045 added the federal
expert witness rule into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts had no sta39

Id. (emphasis added).

State Rd. Comm'n of W.Va. v. Bd. of Park Comm'rs, 173 S.E.2d 919, 924 (W. Va. 1970)
(emphasis added).
41
Id. at 925 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970)).
42
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14.
40

43

Id. at 16.
,4
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (2008); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (2008). "Because the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
we often refer to interpretations of the Federal Rules when discussing our own rules." Hardwood
Group v. Larocco, 631 S.E.2d 614, 619 n.6 (W. Va. 2006). Therefore, because the state and federal expert witness rules are practically identical, and because interpretation of the federal rule
influences the jurisprudence of the state rule, this Note intertwines discussions of both rules.
45
West Virginia added the expert witness discovery rule to the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1978.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss2/8
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tutory polestar to help them determine whether to compel discovery of all the
government's expert appraisals in condemnation cases. Thus, the extent to
which expertly held facts and opinions were discoverable "was the subject of
much discussion and division in the federal courts." 46 However, the majority of
was generally not entitled to discovery of the govcases held that the landowner
47
appraisals.
expert
ernment's
A.

An Anti-Landowner Policy

One eminent domain scholar and attorney, M. Jay Devaney, has classified the pre-rule federal courts into four different groups based on the courts'
attitudes towards discovery of expert appraisals.48 The first group imposed the
most limits on discovery and refused discovery of any information regarding the
use of expert appraisers, including the appraisers' names and addresses. 49 A
second group of courts distinguished between facts upon which the appraisals
were based and the opinions of the appraisers, permitting discovery of the former, but not the latter. 50 A third group of courts permitted discovery of comparable sales data based on the belief that lists of sales were "the best evidence of
fair market value., 51 Moving towards liberalization of discovery, a fourth group
of courts "did recognize some discovery of the adverse party's expert opinion."5 2
The arguments these courts adopted in defense of their anti-discovery
policies are varied, and include attorney-client and work-product privilege.5 3
Although these two arguments no longer have much force in the realm of expert
discovery, one argument adopted by the pre-rule courts-the state's "unfairness"
argument-had the most force, and, thus, retains some vestigial relevance today.
As the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Meyer54 noted:

47

United States v. John R. Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
Hoover v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1140 n.1 I (5th Cir. 1980).

48

M. Jay Devaney, Discovery of the Valuation Expert in Condemnation Proceedings,20 REAL

46

PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1093, 1098-1100 (Winter 1985).
49

Id. at 1099.

50

Id.
Id. at 1100.
Id.

51
52

Id. at 1101-02. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (rejecting the argument
that the attorney-client privilege protects "information which an attorney secures from a witness
while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation"); United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 7374 (9th Cir. 1968) (rejecting the argument that the work-product doctrine protects expert information); Shell v. State Rd. Dep't, 135 So.2d 857, 860 (Fla. 1962) (rejecting the argument that the
worksheets of the state's appraisers are protected work product).
54 Meyer, 398 F.2d 66.
53
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[m]ost of the decisions denying pretrial access to the opinions
of experts employed by the opposing party rest on the ground
that to allow such discovery would be unfair to the opposing
party, because it would permit the discoverer to exploit the diligence of opposing counsel and shirk counsel's own duty of independent preparation.
Basically, this argument posits that such a practice of disclosure would
help the landowner at the expense of the state. This argument relies on the mistaken premise that it is somehow fairer to force the individual landowner, whose
land is already being condemned, to pay for the appraisals the parties need to
determine the land's value. 56 In its defense, the government argued that "requiring the city to inform the landowner of the appraised value of the easement[]
will chill its ability to obtain easements ... at a nominal cost through negotiation. 5 7 As if the state should ever be in the position of trying to wrest land from
a private landowner at a nominal cost.
The majority of pre-Rule courts that bought the state's preposterous
"unfairness argument" consequently prevented landowners from discovering all
of the government's expert appraisals. 8 As one court reasoned, because the
"land is open to inspection by all parties, no information concerning the same is
sought from the Government that is not readily available to the [landowners].
This "unfairness" principle was used by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 6816.5 Acres of Land v. United States.6° Here, the government condemned 6,816.5 acres of the landowner's 33,150-acre New Mexico ranch for a
10,000-acre reservoir project. 61 The jury awarded the landowner $155,000 as
just compensation, after the government argued that the project would positively
affect the value of the landowner's property and that those benefits should offset
any monetary compensation it owed him. 62 The landowner fought the government for more compensation and tried to compel discovery of the contents of an
appraisal report made by an expert the government hired but did not call at trial. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the government
and said that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting discovery
55

Id. at 75.

56

See, e.g., Meyer, 398 F.2d at 71; Alaska v. Leach, 516 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Alaska 1973).

Columbia, S.C. v. Costle, 710 F.2d 1009, 1013 (4th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
58
See, e.g., Dicker v. United States, 352 F.2d 455, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146, 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
59
7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. at 146 (stating that "the burden of proof is upon the
property owner to prove the value of the land in question").
0
6816.5 Acres of Land v. United States, 411 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1969).
61
Id. at 835.
62
Id.at 836-37.
63
Id. at 839.
57
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of the government's appraisal reports. 64 The Court found "if the landowner
'wanted more expert testimony on value it was for... [him] to produce such
65
evidence."'
In deciding 6816.5 Acres of Land, the Tenth Circuit relied on Dicker v.
United States,66 a D.C. Circuit case where the government condemned warehouse property and unimproved lots in Washington, D.C. 67 The government's
expert appraisals of the property ranged from $1,400,000 to $1,372,000, and the
landowners' experts' appraisals ranged from $2,962,000 to $2,577,000.6 However, the landowners later learned that two other government experts appraised
the property in excess of $2 million. 69 Not surprisingly, the government did not
call those experts at the condemnation proceeding.70 The landowners sought
discovery of these appraisals, but the court denied their request:
the [landowners] have not been prejudiced. Any testimony [the
experts] might have given would have been cumulative only.
That the Government consulted them but did not use their opinions is not relevant evidence of value; Appellants could not
show the prior consultation in order to bolster the witnesses'
credibility, nor could they seek to arouse jury prejudices by
showing the prior consultation under the guise of proving the
experts' qualifications.7 1
The Court then said that the landowners must provide their own expert testimony on the value of the land. 72 Thus, before 1970, courts generally denied landowner's requests for government appraisals in condemnation cases because of
perceived unfairness to the government.73

64

Id.

65

67

Id. at 839 (citing Dicker v. United States, 352 F.2d 455, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
Dicker, 352 F.2d at 455.
Id.

68

Id. at 456-57.

69

Id. at 457.

70

Id.

71

Id.
Id.

66

72

See also United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 at 75 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Most of the decisions
denying pretrial access to the opinions of experts employed by the opposing party rest on the
ground that to allow such discovery would be unfair to the opposing party because it would permit
the discoverer to exploit the diligence of opposing counsel and shirk counsel's own duty of independent preparation.").
73
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Pro-landownerStirringsin the Ninth Circuit

Against this backdrop of anti-landowner prejudice, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1968 tried to change the judiciary's harsh stance with its
bold decision in United States v. Meyer.74
In Meyer, the government condemned privately held land in California's Yosemite National Park.75 As part of the pre-trial condemnation proceeding, the landowner deposed three government appraisers and called for the production of their appraisal reports; the appraisers (on the advice of government
counsel) refused to produce them and also refused to answer many of the landowner's deposition questions, including questions regarding comparable sales
and the nature and character of the condemned property.76 The Court noted
"essentially, the witnesses testified only to the fact that they had been employed
by the government ...
The only documents they produced were their employment contracts, copies. of photos of the property, and some maps. 78 The
landowners objected, yet received no relief from the trial court.79

However, the Ninth Circuit overturned the trial court and compelled the
government to produce the appraiser's reports. 80 The Court said:
In sum, in condemnation cases full pretrial disclosure of appraisers' opinions and the details upon which they are based is
required if the rules are to accomplish their purpose to "make a
trial less of a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest
with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practica81
extent.,
ble
In reaching this holding, the Court rejected the government's long-used
"unfairness" argument by stating that it was "not an acceptable ground for barring discovery of facts known and opinions held by appraisers in condemnation
cases" because the risks of abuse are not great when balanced against the need
for expert testimony in condemnation cases. 82 The court said that "the testimony of appraisers is the crux of the trial, and full disclosure of their opinions and
the foundations upon which they rest are essential to adequate litigation. 8 3
74

Id. at 68.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 69 n. 2.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 69.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 70 (citing United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)).

80

81
82
83

Id. at 75.
Id.
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More pointedly, the only issue tried in condemnation cases is that of just compensation, because the government almost always has the power and the right to
condemn land.84
Therefore, the court opined that:
[w]here the opinions of experts are central to litigation, as in
condemnation cases, the irreducible risk of abuse must simply
be accepted. In the end, the central object of litigation is not to
reward diligent counsel and penalize lazy or inept counsel, but
to achieve a just adjudication of the controversy between the
parties. That can be accomplished only by a full exposure of the
relevant facts.85
Furthermore, the Meyer court rejected the government's argument that
the landowner was free to obtain the same information from other appraisers by
recognizing that the landowner was not seeking additional appraisals, he was
seeking the government's appraisals. 86 These reports are, necessarily, only
available from the government's appraisers. 87 The court justified the production
of these reports in condemnation cases by stating that property appraisal is
"complex and technical," and evidence of a property's value consists primarily
of expert opinions, which are "notoriously disparate., 88 Thus, "there is no basis
to believe that the information sought to be elicited, since it is subjective in nature, might be obtained ...

except by ...the only person, the expert, who has

such information. 89
Finally, the Meyer court anticipated the advent of the new "expert witness" rule, i.e., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4), and recognized the
distinction that the new rule would make between those experts that parties intend to call at trial and other experts that parties merely consulted, but did not
intend to call at trial. 90 The Court found it sound policy to compel production of
expert appraisal reports when the government planned to call the expert as a trial
witness.9' The Court stated "cross examination of appraisers regarding the basis
of their opinions is one of the principal means for testing the weight which
should be given to their opinion testimony. Pretrial discovery is particularly

84

Id. at71.

85
86

Id. at 75.
Id. at 72.

87

Id.

88

Id. at 69.
Id. at 72 n.7 (citing United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, etc., 32 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D. Md.

89

1963)).
90

Id. at 76.

91

This distinction is FED.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
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important to preparation for effective cross-examination of such witnesses...
,,92

But, is it sound policy to compel production of the appraisal reports of
experts whom the government consults, but does not plan to call at trial? The
court recognized that this policy argument was not as compelling because it
could not ground its reasoning in the necessity of adequate cross-examination,
nor could it claim that discovery from non-testifying witnesses clarified the dispute or narrowed the issues.93 However, the Meyer court did manage to solidly
anchor its reason for compelling production of the reports of non-testifying experts by recognizing that non-testifying appraisers may have:
discovered facts, applied techniques, or arrived at opinions
which, though not acceptable to the government, were nevertheless relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and helpful to
the landowner. It would be intolerable to allow a party to suppress unfavorable evidence by deciding not to use a retained
expert at trial.94
Thus, the Meyer Court rejected the government's "unfairness" argument
and attempted to place the government, with its limitless resources, and the landowner, with his finite resources, on a somewhat level playing field.95 Had the
majority of courts followed Meyer, modern condemnation proceedings would be
fairer to landowners because Meyer helped to equalize the inherent power imbalance that exists between the government and a lone individual.
C.

Meyer Ignored

However, the 1968 Meyer decision lost much of its persuasive force
when Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) was born in 1970.96 Federal
Rule 26(b)(4), the so-called "expert rule," can be divided into two parts: Part A,
or Rule 26(b)(4)(A), regulates discovery of expert information when the other
side expects to call the expert at trial; Part B, or Rule 26(b)(4)(B), regulates discovery of expert information when the other side does not expect to call the
expert at trial.9 7 Rule 26(b)(4)(B) states:

92

Meyer, 398 F.2d at 72.

93

Id. at 76.

94

Id.

95

Id.

"The most compelling reason why Meyer is not controlling is that it was decided prior to the
amendment of the discovery rules in 1970 which added Rule 26(b)(4)." Hoover v. United States,
611 F.2d 1132, 1141 (5th Cir. 1980).
97
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)-(B).
96
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Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition,
discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. But a party may do so
only... on showing exceptional circumstances under which it
is impracticable for the party seeking discovery98 to obtain facts
or opinions on the same subject by other means.
Of course, in condemnation cases, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is most applicable, primarily because the landowner is trying to compel discovery of experts' reports even
when those experts are not on the government's list of disclosed experts expected to testify at trial.
One of the first cases to interpret this rule in light of a condemnation
proceeding is United States v. John R. Piquette Corp.99 In this case, the government condemned the landowners' property for office space. 1° The landowners
sought to compel production of appraisals of experts whom the government
intended to call at trial, as well as experts whom the government did not intend
to call at trial. 101 Recognizing the historical division among the courts over the
discoverability of non-testifying experts' opinions, the court rejected the "preamendment liberality" of Meyer:1 2 The Court believed "the best course is to
follow the ... amended rule rather than the 'free discovery' advanced by the
Meyer case."' 10 3 The court based its reasoning on the judiciary's old fear of "unfairness" to the government, and said that the procedure of the new rule limits
the risk of unfairness by limiting discovery to trial witnesses. °4 Thus, the Piqueue court held that the landowner could not compel production of appraisals
performed by experts that the government hired but did not plan to call at trial,
unless the landowner could show "exceptional circumstances. ' t 5
Eighteen years after Piquette, the judiciary's fear of unfairness to the
government was still alive and well, and it was still guiding court decisions regarding discovery in condemnation cases. In Hoover v. United States,1°6 the
98
99

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
United States v. John R. Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Mich. 1971).

Id. at 372.
101 Id. at 371-372.
102
Id. at 371. The Piquette court characterized the Meyer court's standard as "free discovery of
'0o

the opinions of all experts whether they were to be used at trial or not." Id. This statement glosses
over the narrow fact that Meyer was a condemnation case and that the Meyer court specifically
argued for such "free discovery" in condemnation cases only.
103 Id. at 372.
104
105
106

Id. at 373 (citing Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules, 43 F.R.D. 211, 235).
Id. at 372-73.
Hoover v. United States, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980).
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government condemned a privately owned Alabama cave and 264 acres of sur07
rounding land because the cave was home to an endangered species of bat.
The landowner sought the appraisal of an expert that the government hired but
did not expect to call at trial. 0 8 Sympathetic to the government's argument that9
disclosure would compromise its "competitive position" with the landowner,'
the court relied on the anti-landowner precedent of Piquette and its ideological
brethren and declared that under Rule 26(b)(4), "the government enjoys a qualified privilege protecting the contents of the appraisal report in condemnation
proceedings." "0 Thus, the court denied the landowner's request for the appraisal," l1 broadly stating that "it is clear that a landowner is2 not entitled as a matter
of right to discover the government's appraisal report.""
In sum, despite the bold advances made by Meyer, some courts still
cling to the government's tired, old "unfairness to the government" argument.
These courts have refused to push the government towards transparency in just
compensation proceedings. And it appears Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(B) has given
these courts another tool to help them accomplish this dubious goal: instead of
intelligently analyzing eminent domain case law, and instead of exploring the
ideological fissures present in condemnation precedent, courts may simply use
Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to erect a discovery barrier of "exceptional circumstances" whenever a landowner moves to compel the government to produce
appraisal reports made by experts whom the government does not expect to call
at trial. Sadly, some courts still seem to be under the mesmerizing spell of the
government's smoke-and-mirrors unfairness argument. As if a Lilliputian individual seeking to obtain just compensation for the land that the government
swiped out from under him could ever put the Brobdingnagian government in an
"unfair" position. 113
IV. WHY THE LAW IS AN Ass

The fact that some courts are still using the discovery Rules to help the
government obtain and keep its "competitive position" against individual landowners in condemnation cases is just absurd. As a matter of public policy,
107
108

Id. at 1135.
The landowner sought the government's appraisal through a Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA) request, yet the specifics of FOIA law required the court to perform a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) analysis. Id. at 1138-39, 1142.
109

Id. at 1140.

112

III

Id.at1142.
Id. at 1143.

112

Id. at 1142.

113

Jonathan Swift, an Irish author whose life spanned both the 17 1 and 18' h centuries, wrote

"Gulliver's Travels," which is a satirical work that contains characters called "Lilliputions," who
are only one-twelfth the size of average humans, and "Brobdingnagians," who are ten times larger
than average humans.
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courts should use the Rules to level the playing field for landowners by forcing
the government to justify how it arrived at its take-it-or-leave-it figure of "just
compensation." As the Florida Supreme Court wisely said in Shell v. Florida
State Road Department'1 4:
It must be borne in mind that in a condemnation proceeding the
property of the land owner is subject to taking by the condemnor without the owner's consent. The condemnee is a party
through no fault or volition of his own.... [I]t [is] incumbent
upon the condemnor to award 'just' compensation for the taking. In view of this constitutional mandate, the awarding of
compensation which is 'just' should be the care of the condemning authority as well as that of the party whose land is being taken. Unlike litigation between private parties condemnation by any governmental authority should not be a matter of
'dog eat dog' or 'win at any cost.' Such attitude and procedure
would be decidedly unfair to the property owner. He would be
at a disadvantage in every instance for the reason that the govemment has unlimited resources created by its inexhaustible
power of taxation." 15
Therefore, if the state is to satisfy its statutory and constitutional mandates to ensure that the landowner receives just compensation for a taking, the
concept of "unfairness" should not even enter the state's financial equation: "If
the governmental unit or agency is seeking to effectuate the 'summum bonum,'
as it should in every condemnation suit, there is no justificationfor cutting corners or being secretive to the possible detriment of the individual land owner
whose property is being taken from him against his will.""' 6
Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court argued that the state would
gain an advantage by revealing all its appraisals to the landowner because the
landowner would likelier settle if he learns the state's basis for its valuation of
his property."' Such a "speedy and inexpensive"" 8 settlement is not only preferable, but also satisfies the federal and West Virginia statutory mandate to
"avoid litigation and relieve congestion in the courts."" 9 Furthermore, speedy
settlements, as opposed to lengthy and consequently expensive litigation, could
also save taxpayers' money.
114

Shell v. Fla. Rd. Dep't, 135 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1962) (holding that, as a matter of public poli-

cy, appraisals performed at the request of the government in a condemnation suit are not protected
by Florida's attorney work product doctrine).
115
Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
116

Id. at 861 (emphasis added).

117

Id.
Id.
W. VA. CODE

118

119

§ 54-3-2 (1972).
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Thus, truly just compensation is not only a goal that the state should
strive to reach, but it is also a constitutional mandate which the state must satisfy. So, why have the courts time and time again sided with the state against the
landowner? Why has the judiciary saddled landowners with the heavy burden
of proving unfairness in a condemnation proceeding? Why is the
20 government
trying to wrangle property from landowners at a "nominal cost?"'
We may never know why the judiciary does what it does, but the remainder of this Note discusses two arguments that landowners might be able to
use to defeat such judicial hostility. As discussed below, landowners must
strive to compel the judiciary to recognize, as a matter of public policy, the value of transparency in condemnation actions.
V.

A PUSH TOWARDS FAIRNESS

Recall that the discovery rules generally do not permit opposing parties
to discover the facts or opinions held by experts retained by the other side,
whom the other side does not expect to call at trial. 12 1 But there are two exceptions to this general rule: parties can discover
facts or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or
specially employed by another party in anticipationof litigation
or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a
witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstancesunder which it is impracticable
to obtain facts or opinions on
for the party seeking discovery 122
the same subject by other means.
Thus, under this rule, it appears that courts can compel the government to produce expert appraisals if the appraisals were conducted before the government
anticipated litigation over the condemnation, 123 or the court can compel the government to produce such appraisals where the landowner shows "exceptional
circumstances."' 24 Although both arguments could help rebalance the power
between the government and the lone landowner, this Note concludes that the
"exceptional circumstances" argument is preferable because a court's acceptance of this argument would conclusively establish government transparency as
a matter of public policy in condemnation proceedings.

120
121
12

123
124

Columbia, S.C. v. Costle, 710 F.2d 1009, 1013 (4th Cir. 1983).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); W. Va. R. Civ. P 26(b)(4)(B).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); W. Va. R. Civ. P 26(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
Hereinafter, this argument shall be known as the "not in anticipation of litigation" argument.
Hereinafter, this argument shall be known as the "exceptional circumstances" argument.
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A.

Not in Anticipation of Litigation

Using the "not in anticipation of litigation" argument, the landowner
can argue that the state simply does not commission its appraisals of condemned
land in anticipation of litigation - and thus cannot invoke the discovery shield of
26(b)(4)(B) by claiming that it hired its expert appraisers in anticipation of litigation - because the whole purpose of the eminent domain law is to avoid litigation: "The purposes of this article are.., to encourage and expedite the acquisition of real property or any interest therein by agreements with persons so as to
avoid litigationand relieve congestion in the courts.'' 12 5 As one Court noted "a
process designed to avoid litigation can hardly be said to be one in anticipation
of litigation."126
This argument was discussed by the Federal District Court of Maryland
in Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land in
Prince George's County,127 where the Court held that the government's precondemnation appraisal reports are not obtained in anticipation of litigation and therefore not entitled to the enhanced discovery protection of 26(b)(4)(b) as a matter of law.128 In this case, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority ("WMATA") condemned land in Prince George's County for the
extension of a light rail line. 129 The government initially appraised the condemned land at $888,923, but claimed it was worth only $51,000 at the time of
the taking. 130 The landowner, through discovery, asked the government to disclose the identity of its pre-condemnation appraiser and also asked for a copy of
the original appraisal report that formed the basis of the agency's determination
of "just compensation.' 131 The magistrate found as a matter of fact that the government's appraisal was not prepared in anticipation of litigation, and thus ordered the government to "'give full and unevasive answers to the interrogatories
and defendant's requests for production of documents."1 3 2 The Federal District
Court upheld the magistrate's ruling, but took it one step further by stating that
the appraisal report was not prepared in anticipation of litigation as a matter of
law.133
In reaching this holding, the Court relied on the language of federal
condemnation law, which states inter alia that the purpose of the federal condemnation law (which requires the condemning agency to obtain a pre(1972) (emphasis added).

125

W. VA. CODE § 54-3-2

126
127

W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, 639 S.E.2d 693, 703 (2006) (Davis, C.J., dissenting).
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 342 F.Supp.2d 378 (D. Md. 2004).

128

Id. at 380.

129

Id. at 379.

130

Id. at 380.

131

Id.
Id.

132

133

Id. (emphasis added).
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condemnation appraisal)' 34 was "'. . . to avoid litigationand relieve congestion
in the courts[.] ' '"' 35 The Court also relied on American Jurisprudence Second,
which states that the statutory requirement of negotiation in eminent domain
proceedings is for the government to acquire private lands without litigation,
36
which saves the public and the condemnee the costs of litigation.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the government's offer and the underlying appraisal are not documents prepared in anticipation of litigation and,
thus, are not protected from discovery by Rule 26(b)(4)(B).1 37 'To conclude
otherwise would thwart the intent of Congress in its establishment of a mandatory process specifically designed to avoid litigation. A process designed to avoid
' 38
litigation can hardly be said to be one in anticipation of litigation.'
Chief Justice Robin Davis of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia saw some logic in the above argument and used it in her dissent in the
Fort Pleasant case. In applying the One Parcel of Land "not in anticipation of
litigation" analysis to the Fort Pleasant case, she concluded that the majority
erred when it prohibited discovery of the state's pre-condemnation appraisal
reports regarding the Fort Pleasant landowner's property. 39 "Because the precondemnation appraisal reports were not created in anticipation of litigation,
they are subject to discovery under Rule 26(b)(1), regardless of whether the
preparing expert will testify in the condemnation proceedings."'' 40 Justice Davis's apparent willingness to rebalance condemnation law in West Virginia offers citizens a glimmer of hope for fundamental fairness in these proceedings,
but for reasons detailed below, this "not in anticipation of litigation" argument is
not the best argument one can make.
On one hand, the "not in anticipation of litigation" argument makes
good sense in light of Congress's statutory mandate to the government to "avoid
litigation" in the condemnation process. By showing its appraisals to the landowner, the government will fulfill the purpose of the statute by "promot[ing]
public confidence in [its] land acquisition practices."'' 41 Furthermore, by forcing
the government to show all of its appraisals instead of just its lowest appraisal,
the court would begin lifting the veil of secrecy surrounding just compensation
proceedings and the state would begin to reverse its "win at any cost" policy.
However, this "not in anticipation of litigation" argument suffers from a
few flaws: first, it is technical in nature and, therefore, the government can easi134 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1987).
135 Id.; One Parcelof Land, 342 F.Supp.2d at 381 (emphasis in original).
136

One Parcelof Land, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 381.

137

Id.

138 Id.

139 W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, 639 S.E.2d 693, 704 (W. Va. 2006) (Davis, C.J. dissenting).
140

Id.
141 § 54-3-2.
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ly devise strategies to get around it. For example, the government could obtain
one appraisal of the condemned land and wait for negotiations to fail and litigation to ensue before commissioning any more appraisals. These later appraisals
would, technically, be performed in anticipation of litigation, and the state could
persuasively argue that they are protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Second, the
federal cases advancing this argument impose one questionable limitation,
which Justice Davis's dissent seems to have implicitly accepted: although these
cases permit the landowner to call the government's appraiser and to see his
report, they prevent the landowner from informing the jury that the appraiser
was originally employed by the government. 142 The cases prohibit this information from being brought to the jury's attention for fear of "prejudice."' 143 Justice
Davis seems to accept this limitation, although she does not explicitly adopt it as
sound legal policy.144
This limitation is questionable for two reasons: one, this limitation is
based on the old "unfairness to the government" argument, which should be laid
to rest as a matter of public policy; two, it undercuts the transparency that is
necessary for the government to fulfill the purpose of the condemnation statute.
The Court should reject any argument that a single landowner, who is subjected
to the awesome power of the government in a condemnation proceeding and
who can be forcibly removed from his land by the government if he refuses to
cooperate, can put the government in an unfavorable position in a condemnation
proceeding. As noted above, in condemnation proceedings, there is generally
no question as to whether the government has the authority to take the land.
Thus, the only question that remains is how much compensation the landowner
will receive in exchange for the taking. Therefore, the government is not in an
unfavorable position, but in a favorable one, because it has the inherent power to
simply take the land it needs, and the judiciary has given the government legal
latitude to determine, with apparent impunity, what constitutes "just compensation." The onus is on the landowner to show that the government is acting unfairly. It seems, therefore, that condemnation proceedings are more than fair to
the state and fundamentally unfair to the aggrieved condemnee.
Second, the landowner should be permitted as a matter of policy to disclose to the jury that an expert appraiser was originally hired by the government.
145
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, any party can impeach any witness.
Expert witnesses are routinely questioned about their feelings, biases, or prejudices if revelation of these emotions would shed light on the value of their tesOne Parcel of Land, 342 F.Supp. 2d at 382 (citing Wash. Metro. Area. Transit Auth. v. One
Parcel of Land, 424 F.Supp. 218 (D. Md. 1976); Wash. Metro. Area. Transit Auth. v. One Parcel
of Land, 450 F.Supp. 122 (D. Md. 1978)).
142

143

Id.

144 Cookman, 639 S.E.2d at 704 (Davis, C.J., dissenting).
145
FED. R. EvtD. 607. Under the Rule, "impeaching" includes exposing a witness's bias and
prejudices. Id.
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timony.146 "Cross-examination may be used to bring out the fact that a witness
is regularly or frequently employed as an expert witness by one of the litigants,
or to prove facts and circumstances which would naturally create a bias in the
' 47
mind of the witness for or against the cause of either of the litigants."'
Why should an expert appraiser in a condemnation proceeding receive
special treatment? Why are courts protecting the bargaining position of the
government at the expense of the citizen landowner? It is fundamentally unfair
for the courts to give the government more ammunition against the individual in
a condemnation proceeding by letting the state protect the fact that it hired certain appraisers. The courts have a mandate to help the landowner achieve "just
compensation" for his land, yet the courts undercut this mandate when they help
the government operate in secret. As a matter of public policy, the courts should
be working to balance the power imbalance inherent in eminent domain proceedings. The courts should prevent the government from assuming a competitive position against the landowner and should not be trying to obtain an individual's land at the lowest possible cost; the government should assume a position of social responsibility and should work to ensure that the landowner is
justly compensated for the taking. Disclosing the fact that an expert appraiser
was originally hired by the government-and that his appraisal was subsequently
rejected by the government-would help the jury weigh the credibility of the
expert's testimony because it would show jurors all the facts they need to establish the true value of "just compensation."
In sum, although the "not in anticipation of litigation" argument would
help rebalance the West Virginia's weighted condemnation scales, it is hypertechnical and therefore fatally flawed. Furthermore, prohibiting the landowner
from informing a jury that an expert appraiser was originally hired by the state
is a material and prejudicial limitation that the courts should reject in the name
of "just compensation." This argument may win some of the time, but the landowner can make a better argument.
B.

Inherently Exceptional Circumstances

Although the "not in anticipation of litigation" argument does move the
government in the direction of transparency and fundamental fairness, it does
not go far enough. A better argument is one not based on technicalities, but one
based on sound public policy. Thus, the landowner should argue-and courts
should adopt the reasoning-that condemnation proceedings are inherently "exceptional circumstances," and, therefore, are not shielded from discovery by
26(b)(4)(B). 148 Under this reasoning, the state's appraisals
should only be pro49
tected by the general discovery rule, Rule 26(b)(1).1
146

31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 74 (2007).

147

Id.

"A party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by
an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litiga148
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Meyer, discussed above, set the stage for this argument by forcing the
state to show the landowner appraisals performed by all its experts. 50 Recall
that in Meyer, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that it would be "intolerable" to let the state suppress unfavorable expert evidence by neglecting to
call certain experts at trial. 15 ' Furthermore, the court laid the foundation for the
argument that condemnation proceedings inherently constitute exceptional cirhave uniqueness "because
cumstances by concluding that condemnation actions
1 52
of their reliance upon expert opinion as to value."
Although most courts have not incorporated the Meyer ideals into their
interpretations of Rule 26(b)(4)B) and have refused to follow its liberal spirit,
some courts have been brave enough to follow the balanced approach that Meyer offers. For example, The Supreme Court of Alaska not only followed Meyer,
but took it one step further with its decision in Alaska v. Leach153 by holding, in
part, "that the very nature of a condemnation case in and of itself constitutes
'exceptional circumstances'
within the intendment of Civil Rule
26(b)(4)(B)..."154 In Leach, the government condemned private land and gave
the landowner a copy of the appraisal prepared by the expert whom the state
planned to call at trial.155 When the landowner requested the appraisals prepared
by experts whom the state did not plan to call at trial, the state refused. 5 6 The
landowner asked the trial court to order the state to produce the appraisals of the
restate's non-testifying experts, and the trial court granted
15 7 the landowner's
quest; the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this decision.
In reaching this holding, the court soundly rejected the state's "unfairness argument." The state argued that it would be unfair to let the landowner
benefit from the state's trial preparation without showing that he could not obtain the same information elsewhere. 158 However, the court said:
The question should not be decided on the basis of what is fair
or unfair to petitioner's counsel, but rather on the basis of what
is most likely to attain the objectives of the rule. The broad poltion or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial ... [except
upon a] showing of exceptional circumstances ... " FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
149
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 70 (9th Cir. 1968). Note that in Meyer, all the state's
150
appraisers in question were potential witnesses. Id. at 68.
151 Id. at 76.
152
Alaska v. Leach, 516 P.2d 1383, 1385-86 (Alaska 1973) (characterizing Meyer).
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 1386.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1383.

id.
Id.
Id. at 1384.
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icy of all our rules permitting discovery is to eliminate surprise
at the trial and to make it convenient for the parties to find and
preserve all available evidence concerning the facts in issue,
thereby encouraging the settlement or expeditious trial of litigation.' 59
Thus, the Court rejected the state's unfairness argument by stating that
"considerations of unfairness do not furnish a basis" for rejecting the landowner's request. 60 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that Alaska's Civil Rule
26(b)(4)(C) requires the party seeking the discovery (i.e., the landowner) to pay
the other party (i.e., the state) a portion of the expert's fees and expenses.
This rule ameliorates much of the unfairness the state claims to bear.
After rejecting the state's unfairness argument, the court held that condemnation actions, standing alone, satisfy the exceptional circumstances test of
Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Relying on Meyer and drawing on its own policy of liberal
interpretation of the discovery rules, 162 the court pointed out several factors that
make condemnation actions in and of themselves "exceptional circumstances.' 63 These factors include the unique character of condemnation proceedings and the nature of the discovery sought. 64 Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court
took Meyer one logical step further by definitively holding that condemnation
cases inherently constitute exceptional circumstances outside the restrictive
boundaries of Rule 26(b)(4)(B). At least in Alaska, the landowner in a condemnation proceeding is entitled to all of the state's expert appraisals, whether or
not the state plans to call all the experts at trial. As the Meyer court said, "[Ift
would be intolerable to allow a party to suppress unfavorable evidence by deciding not to use a retained expert at trial."' 65
Leach remains good case law in Alaska, yet the overwhelming majority
of courts have failed to follow its bold lead.' 66 Courts seem sympathetic to the
government's trite "unfairness" argument. Yet, the judiciary's anti-landowner,
pro-government stance cannot be the logical result of a federal law whose purpose is to "avoid litigation and relieve congestion in the courts."' 67 The judiciary's stance cannot be the logical result of a constitutional mandate to provide
159
160
161
162

Id. at 1385.
Id.
W. VA.R. Cv. P. 26(b)(4)(C) is identical to the Alaska Rule.
See generally Miller v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (Alaska 1964); Sec. Indus., Inc. v. Fickus, 439

P.2d 172 (Alaska 1968).
163 Leach, 516 P.2d at 1386.
164 Id. The Leach court also pointed to its liberal discovery policy as a factor in determining
whether condemnation actions, standing alone, are inherently exceptional circumstances.
165 Id. (citing United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968)).
166

Leach, 516 P.2d 1383.

167 § 4651.
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"just compensation" to the aggrieved landowner.168 As the Florida Supreme
Court stated in Shell, unfairness to the state is not the issue: unfairness to the
landowner is. 16 9 Due to the unique nature of condemnation proceedings and due
to the state's mandate to ensure that the landowner receives just compensation,
the state simply does not have a competitive position to protect.
In the name of common sense, good judgment, fundamental fairness,
and constitutionality, all courts should follow Meyer and Leach. Condemnation
cases, as noted above, simply are exceptional circumstances. Just ask any individual who has been ousted from his home whether this extraordinary governmental action constitutes "exceptional circumstances." Just ask any individual
if he or she has the financial resources to compete with the government, and it
becomes clear, under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), that condemnation cases are inherently
exceptional circumstances because it is impractible, if not financially impossible, for the landowner to obtain all the facts or opinions regarding the value of
his land.
Thus, courts should be forcing governmental agencies to play fair in the
eminent domain game. The Alaska Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals got it right, 70 yet other courts continue to drag their proverbial feet.
In West Virginia, with condemnation at the fore because of Corridor H, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia should be working to rebalance the
scales of power in condemnation actions. However, the Supreme Court recently
rejected the opportunity to change the state's condemnation policies for the better by sidestepping the Fort Pleasant case. 171
Recall that, in the Fort Pleasant case, the state originally sought a writ of
prohibition against the Circuit Court of Hardy County because the lower court
had ordered the state Department of Highways to produce appraisals and other
evaluations relating to the condemned property prepared by all its experts,
whether or not the state planned to call these experts as witnesses in the proceeding. 72 Although the Supreme Court recognized the underlying discovery
issue as an "important policy question,"'' 73 the court declined to decide the real
question and simply granted the state's requested writ of prohibition on technical grounds. Specifically, the Supreme Court evaded the big policy question by
latching onto procedure; it remanded the case back to the circuit court with an

168

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

169 Shell v. Fla. Rd. Dep't., 135 So.2d 857, 861 (Fla. 1962).
170 See generally United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); Leach, 516 P.2d 1383.
171 See generally W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, 639 S.E.2d 693, 694, 697 (W. Va.
2006).
172 Id. The state also objected to the circuit court's order to produce appraisals on land it had
condemned within one-half mile of the subject property, but that issue is not the subject of this
paper.
173
Id. at 698.
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order that the circuit court make "findings regarding the presence or absence
of
'exceptional circumstances"' that warranted the discovery of the appraisals. 174
However, the Supreme Court strongly hinted that it would take up the
real issue if the parties came before it again, and even adopted a new syllabus
point designed to facilitate its review of this specific discovery issue: "In order
to facilitate future review of orders requiring the production of discovery from
or regarding non-testifying experts or consultants, we now specifically hold that
a circuit court is required, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(B) ...to make specific
findings regarding the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying the discovery of facts known or opinions held by an expert or consultant who has been
retained... in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not
expected to be called as a witness ... before the circuit court may compel such
discovery.... 175
Thus, the Fort Pleasantparties were sent back to circuit court, and the
lower court was ordered to make the appropriate findings regarding the existence or absence of exceptional circumstances before compelling the state to
turn over its appraisals. 176 And the circuit court did just that: in August of 2007,
the Circuit Court of Hardy County made the necessary findings and, once again,
177
compelled the state to turn over the appraisals of its non-testifying experts.
Specifically, the court found that "condemnation actions are unique in and of
themselves."' 178 Furthermore, the court also found that "exceptional circumstances are present in this case, thus warranting WVDOH production of all appraisal reports performed on the condemned property at hand, and also those
appraisal reports completed by testifying experts on property surrounding Fort
Pleasant's property."' 179 Once again, the state appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. 80 And yet again, despite its ideological
posturing in Cookman, the Supreme Court rejected the case. The Supreme
Court's action has left West Virginia's circuit courts to flounder in its indeterminate wake.
Thus, the debate over the discoverability of appraisals performed by
non-testifying experts hired by the state in condemnation proceedings continues
in West Virginia. In Hardy County, the state must turn them over. But what
about in the state's other fifty-four counties? Why did the Supreme Court sidestep this important issue?

176

Id.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 700.

177

Order Granting Renewed Motion to Compel, W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Fort Pleasant

174
175

Farms, Inc., No. 04-C-51 (Cir. Ct. of Hardy County, W. Va. Aug.15, 2007).
178
Id.at 5.
179 Id.
180
Petition for Writ of Prohibition, W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Cookman, No. 04-C-51 (W. Va.
Oct. 11, 2007).
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Although the make-up of the West Virginia Supreme Court recently
changed, deep division over the issue likely remains. Justice Starcher, whose
term expired at the end of 2008, concurred in the court's new syllabus point but
dissented from the majority on policy grounds.' 81 Justice Starcher seems to
want to follow the legacy of Meyer and Leach because he argued in his dissent
for a balanced approach to condemnation. 82 Justice Starcher wrote that, "[iun
condemnation cases, the government is the proverbial 800-pound gorilla. It can
take your property, period.... In these lopsided circumstances, a property ownfor just full compensation.
er is entitled to anything that can help make the case
83
These are inherently 'exceptional circumstances.'"'
Furthermore, just as the Meyer and Leach courts did, Justice Starcher
rejected the state's "unfairness" argument as a matter of public policy. He argued that the state "is supposed to be transparent. Secrecy is the exception in
the doing of governmental business."' 84 Following the spirit of Meyer, Justice
Starcher said that the people "have an absolute right to know how a government
arrived at a suggested price for land, including advice that experts told the government-but that the government decided not to follow.' ' 185 Finally, Justice
Starcher upbraided the state for acting like the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security: "The Department of Transportation's 'secrecy policy' on what other
appraisers told them suggests that the DOT thinks they ' 86
are dealing with port
property."'
his
for
due
is
citizen
a
what
of
instead
security,
Justice Starcher has evaluated the issue correctly. He correctly sees that
the state should not be allowed to take a competitive, aggressive stand against
the aggrieved landowner. He correctly states that the state should not be allowed to employ secretive tactics, especially in condemnation cases where "the
only issue is how much the property is worth"' 187 and where the state has a constitutional mandate to ensure that the landowner receives just compensation for
the taking. Thus, Justice Starcher gives West Virginians a glimmer of hope for
fairness in condemnation actions. Although his words are found in a dissent, his
strong dissent suggests that if the Supreme Court ever decides to confront this
"important policy question" head-on, it will have lively debate on the issue.
Justice Starcher's dissenting position in Cookman is stronger than Justice Davis's dissenting position, 188 because she relies on the technical "not in
anticipation of litigation" argument. Although this argument works in Mary-

181

Cooknan, 639 S.E.2d at 700 (Starcher, J.,
dissenting).

182

Id.

183

Id. (emphasis in original).

194
186

Id.
Id.
Id.

187
188

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 701 (Davis, C.J., dissenting).

185
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land,1 89 her position is on shaky ground in West Virginia because of the new
syllabus point adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Cookman.'90 The
language of this syllabus point indicates that the majority considers the state's
non-testifying experts to be hired in anticipation of litigation: "a circuit court
[must] make.., findings ... of exceptional circumstances justifying... discovery ...of opinions ... held by an expert or consultant who has been retained..

•in anticipationof litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to
be called as a witness .... " 191 Thus, because the West Virginia Supreme Court
has already decided that the state acts in anticipation of litigation when it hires
expert appraisers in condemnation cases, a West Virginia condemnee will have
a hard time convincing a court that the state was not acting
in anticipation of
92
litigation, no matter what the condemnation statute says. 1
The conceptual framework the West Virginia Supreme Court built with
its new syllabus point in Cookman is a positive, albeit small, step towards the
balanced approach advocated by Meyer and Leach because it would easily allow
the court to finally find, as Justice Starcher did in his dissent, that all condemnation cases inherently constitute "exceptional circumstances" outside the boundaries of Rule 26(b)(4)(B). The Court could build upon this syllabus point by laying down new common law that compels the state to share all its appraisals of
condemned land with the condemnee. The Circuit Court of Hardy County has
taken a first step towards fundamental fairness by ordering the state to turn over
its appraisals in the Fort Pleasant case; maybe the bold actions of Judge Cookman will inspire the justices of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to
do the same.
VI. CONCLUSION

Meyer and Leach stand for fundamental fairness in condemnation proceedings. The state should never be allowed to take a competitive stance
against the individual landowner in a condemnation proceeding because, as a
matter of public policy, the state should ensure that the landowner receives "just
compensation" for the taking. This requirement is not only good policy, but is
also a constitutional mandate. Furthermore, the state would be advantaged if it
shared its appraisals with the landowner because the landowner would understand the state's basis for formulating just compensation, and would be less likely to file suit.
Given that the construction of Corridor H has pushed the issue of eminent domain to the forefront of social, political, and judicial discourse, the Su189 See generally Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 342 F.Supp.2d 378

(D. Md. 2004).
19
Cookman, 639 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 4.
191
Id. at syl. pt. 6 (emphasis added).
192 Both 42 U.S.C. § 4651 and W. Va. Code § 54-3-2 specifically state that one purpose of the
condemnation law is to "avoid litigation and relieve congestion in the courts .. "
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preme Court of Appeals should seize this timely opportunity to settle this discovery issue once and for all. The Court, as per Justice Starcher, should lay
down new common law that compels the state to share all its expert appraisals
of condemned land with the condemnee in the name of "just compensation." As
Justice Starcher said in his dissent, "the government is the proverbial 800-pound
gorilla... [i]n these lopsided circumstances, a property owner is entitled to anything that can help make the case for full compensation. These are inherently
'exceptional circumstances.' ' 1 93 Now all the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has to do is something-anything-about it.
Allison Minton*

193

Cookman, 639 S.E.2d at 700 (Starcher, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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